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Efficiency in urban transport is a theme that has attracted research in the past (Quinet
and Vickerman 2004). A review of the literature shows two main approaches, the DEA-
Data envelopment Analysis, Chu et al. (1992), Chang and Kao (1992), Karlaftis and
McCarthy (1997) among others and the stochastic frontier models, Jorgenson, Pedersen
and Solvoll (1995) and Jorgensen, Pedersen and Volden (1997) among others.
The aim of this research goes beyond previous research by adopting the latent frontier
model in line with Orea and Kumbhakar (2004). The motivation for the present research
is to combine operational and financial variables in the evaluation of the transport
segments efficiency. Operational efficiency is easily observed on the field; however,
financial efficiency (reported in the company accounts) has no such transparency. The
separation of these two realities - operational and finance - makes the merging of them a
technical problem that needs the support of econometric techniques, such as frontier
models. The motivation for the present research is based on the fact that companies
operating in the French urban transport can be identified as belonging to different
segments: the private, the public and the mixed. The aim of this paper is to investigate
the statistical factors that characterize who belong to such segments.
The contribution of this paper within transport research is twofold. First, it adopts an
innovative stochastic frontier model, which endogenously identifies segments of
transport companies in a sample, overcoming the hypothesis of homogeneity of the
variables adopted by the frontier models previously mentioned. Moreover, it applies the
model to the French urban transport companies. This industry is strongly regulated








































2005). So this paper use an innovative model that may improve our understanding of the
best way to regulate the industry.
The paper is organized as follows: in second section the contextual setting is presented.
The third and forth sections present a survey of the literature and the model
respectively. Section five presents the data and the results. Finally, section six discusses
the results while section seven provides some conclusions.
2. Contextual Setting
The French urban transport is decentralised to local authorities (Kerstens 1996, 1999).
These urban authorities choose to provide transport services by its own operator
("régie"), or alternatively delegates the operation to a private company
1 or to a semi-
public company ("société d'économie mixte"). The not ‘in-house’ operators are legally
selected through tendering processes, but competition is not very pregnant when a semi-
public company wants to succeed to itself (Roy and Yvrande-Billion 2007). But
whenever an organising authority delegates the operation, it signs a contract with the
operator. Contracts can be defined according to alternative risk sharing rules
(Gagnepain 1998, Gagnepain and Ivaldi 2002; Gagnepain 1998):
•  the net cost contract (“CFF: Compensation Financière Forfaitaire”) which provides
incentives on receipts and costs
•  the gross cost contract (“GPF: Gestion à Prix Forfaitaire”) which allocates risks on
costs to the operator and risks on receipts to the public authority
                                                








































•  the management contract (“Gérance”), according to which all risks are borne by the
public authority.
INSERT Figure 1
Data are collected under the responsibility of the CERTU, a ministerial agency (CERTU
2003), and controlled by the GART, a nation-wide association that gathers most of the
local authorities in charge of an urban transport network. The unbalanced panel is
composed of 135 French urban transport units, comprising all forms characterised
above.
3. A survey of the literature
There has been relatively extensive research into the bus industry using a variety of
methods. For an extensive and comprehensive survey, see De Borger, Kerstens and
Costa (2002); for a meta-analysis, see Brons, Nijkamp, Pels and Rietveld (2005).
Restricting our survey to those studies that have used frontier models, we observe the
predominant use of the non-parametric DEA model, whilst the parametric econometric
frontier is applied more scantily. Table 1 below comprises a list of some frontier-model
papers, namely recently published papers and those not surveyed in De Borger,









































What emerges from this research is that there are substantial technical inefficiencies
among urban transport operators (De Borger et al., 2002), calling for the subsidy
allocation to be based on a yardstick type of contract (Dalen and Gómez Lobo, 2003).
4 Latent Class Frontier Models
In this paper, we adopt the stochastic cost econometric frontier approach (kumbhakar
and Lovell 2000). This approach, first proposed by Farrell (1957), came to prominence
in the late 1970s as a result of the work of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Battese
and Corra (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977).
The frontier is estimated econometrically and measures the difference between the
inefficient units and the frontier through the residuals. This is an intuitive approach
based on traditional econometrics. If we assume that the residuals have two components
(noise and inefficiency), the stochastic frontier model emerges. Consequently, the main
issue here is the decomposition of the error terms. Let us present the model more
formally. The general frontier cost function proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) is the following:
(1)                    1,2,    t  N, 1,2,     i     ;   ). ( T e X C C it u it v
it it … = … = =
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Where Cit represents a scalar cost of the decision-unit i under analysis in the t-th period;
Xit is a vector of variables including the input prices and the output descriptors present









































(i) the error term vit is the one that is traditional of the econometric models, assumed to
be independently and identically distributed, that represents the effect of random shocks
(noise vit~N(0, σv²)) and is independent of uit
(ii) the inefficient term uit represents the technical inefficiencies and is assumed
to be positive and normally distributed with a zero mean and variance
2
u σ . The positive
disturbance uit is reflected in a half-normal independent distribution truncated at zero,
signifying that each bus company’s cost must lie on or above its cost frontier. This
implies that any deviation from the frontier is caused by management factors controlled
by the bus companies.
The total variance is defined as
2 2 2
u v σ σ σ + = . The contribution of the error term to the
total variation is as follows:  ) 1 /(
2 2 2 λ σ σ + = v . The contribution of the inefficient term
is: ) 1 /( .





λ = , providing an indication of the
relative contribution of u and v to ε = u + v.
Given that the estimation procedures of equation (1) yield merely the residual ε, rather
than the inefficiency term u, this term in the model must be calculated indirectly
(Greene, 2000). In the case of panel data, such as that used in this paper, Battese and
Coelli (1988) use the conditional expectation of uit, conditioned on the realized value of
the error term  ) ( it it it u v + = ε , as an estimator of uit. In other words,  [] it it u E ε /  is the
mean productive inefficiency for the i-th bus company at any time “t”. Following Orea
and Kumbhakar (2004), we can write equation (1) as a latent class frontier model:
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Where subscript “i” denotes the firm, “t” indicates time and “j” represents the different
classes or groups. The vertical bar signifies that there is a different model for each class
“j” and, therefore, each bus company belongs to the same group in all the periods.
Assuming that v is normally distributed and u follows a half-normal distribution, the
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Where  [ ] vj uj j vj uj j it j j it j it x C σ σ λ σ σ σ β ε /     ,     , ' ln
2 / 1 2 2 = + = = − , while φ  denote the
standard normal density and Φ the cumulative distribution function. The likelihood
function for bus company “i” in group “j” is obtained as the product of the likelihood
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The likelihood function for each bus company is obtained as a weighted average of its
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The previous probabilities must be in the unit interval:  1 0 ≤ ≤ ij P . Furthermore, the sum
of these probabilities for each group must be one: ∑ =
j
ij P 1. In order to satisfy these


























































where the qi is a vector of variables which are used to split the sample, and δj is the
vector of parameters to be estimated. One group is chosen as the reference in the
multinomial logit. The overall log-likelihood function is obtained as the sum of the
individual log-likelihood functions:
∑∑∏ ∑
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The log-likelihood function can be maximised with respect to the parameter set
) , , , ( j j j j j δ λ σ β θ =  using conventional methods (Greene, 2004). Furthermore, the
estimated parameters can be used to estimate the posterior probabilities of class













One important issue in these models is the way in which the number of classes has to be
determined. The usual procedure entails estimating several models with different
numbers of groups and then applying statistical tests to choose the preferred model.
Greene (2005) proposes a procedure in which, beginning from a J* known to be at least
as large as the true J, one can test down (given that the J-1 class model is nested with
the  J class model imposing  1 − = j j θ θ , and based on the likelihood ratio tests). An








































Criteria (AIC) or the Schwarz Bayesian Information criteria. Moutinho, Machado and
Silva (2003) avail of these in a latent class framework using the following expressions:
m n J LF SBIC ). ln( ) ( ln . 2 + − = (9)
m J LF AIC 2 ) ( ln . 2 + − = (10)
where LF(J) is the value that the likelihood function takes for J groups, m is the number
of parameters used in the model and n is the number of observations (n = N.T, where N
is the number of bus companies and T denotes the number of seasons). The preferred
model is that for which the value of the statistic is the lowest. Based on the panel data,
presents the maximum likelihood estimators of model (1) as found in other authors’
recent studies Greene (2000, 2004, 2005).
5. Hypothesis
Consider a French bus company operating in a city. Based in previous research, Roy
and Yvrande-Billion (2007), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002), the frontier model allows the
definition of the following null hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (public vs. private): Public companies are less efficient than private
companies. This hypothesis is based on the traditional hypothesis related to private
versus public property in markets (Williamson 1979). This is a traditional hypothesis in
transportation markets (Davis 1971, Chang and Kao 1992, Roy and Yvrande-Billon
2007). Reasons to support this hypothesis is that with private ownership the rewards and
costs of the activity are more directly concentrated in the stockholders restricting the








































research that found no evidence that private operators are more efficient than public
operators (Caves and Christensen 1980) justifying the present hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (Private companies managed by cost plus contract): Private companies
with cost plus contract perform efficiently. This hypothesis is based in the theory of
transaction costs and property rights, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson
(1981, 1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986). This theory is based in two critical
assumptions: First, the firms cannot write complete contracts concerning their transport
allocation based in the cost-plus rule. Second, investments are specific to firms' assets
so that the same investment is less valuable with different assets. When both
assumptions hold, the theory predicts that firms under-invest because they are afraid
that their relationship with the other firm may end at same point. To minimise under-
investment, firms allocate dedicated asset specificity (Williamson, 1981), which refers
to investment which take place with the prospects of selling a significant amount of
product to a particular customer.  Therefore, assuming the asset specificity strategy,
private companies managed by cost plus contract that are assumed to be efficient.
Hypothesis 3 (Private companies with Net cost Contract): Private companies with net
cost contract perform efficiently searching for profits. This hypothesis is based on
previous research on transportation and on the strategic-group theory (Caves and Porter,
1977) which justifies differences in efficiency scores as being due to differences in the
structural characteristics of units within an industry. In the case of bus companies, units
with similar asset configurations pursue similar strategies with similar results in terms
of performance (Porter, 1979). Although there are different strategic options to be found
among the different sectors of an industry, because of mobility impediments, not all








































the industry. Therefore it is assumed that French private bus companies with net cost
contract, adopt this type of contract because it corresponds to a strategy inherent to an
efficient drive.
Hypothesis 4 (private companies with gross cost contract) Private companies with
gross cost contract perform efficiently searching for profits. This hypothesis is based on
previous research the resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991; Wernerfelt,
1984), which justifies different efficiency scores on the grounds of heterogeneity in
relation to the resources and capabilities on which the bus companies base their
strategies. These resources and capabilities may not be perfectly mobile across the
industry, resulting in a competitive advantage for the best-performing bus companies.
Purchasable assets cannot be considered to represent sources of sustainable profits.
Indeed, critical resources are not available in the market. Rather, they are built up and
accumulated on the bus’s premises, their non-imitability and non-substitutability being
dependent on the specific traits of their accumulation process. The difference in
resources thus results in barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1991) and in the bus managers’
inability to alter their accumulated stock of resources over time. In this context, unique
assets are seen as exhibiting inherently differentiated levels of efficiency; sustainable
profits are ultimately a return on the unique assets owned and controlled by the bus
companies (Teece et al., 1997).








































6. Data and Results
To estimate the production frontier, we used panel data on French urban transport
companies for the years 1995 to 2002 (8 years, 135 units resulting in an unbalanced
panel data of 981 observations). Frontier models require the identification of inputs
(resources) and outputs (transformation of resources). Several criteria can be used in
their selection. One empirical criterion is availability. For the applicability of the
model’s results and its management, it is important to “buy in” to the process that the
measures of inputs and outputs are relevant and adequately measurable, and that
appropriate archival data are available. Usually this latter criterion is used, since it
encompasses the other two already mentioned criteria. Secondly, the literature survey is
a way of ensuring the validity of the research and therefore constitutes another criterion
that needs to be taken into account. The final criterion for measurement selection is the
professional opinion of managers. In this paper, we follow the first two criteria.
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the variables used in the analysis. We transformed
the variables according to the description column. We adopted the traditional log-log










































In this study, we estimate a stochastic translog production
2 function with output
descriptors (Y), input descriptors (X), additional business conditions (Z) and a trend (T).
()
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(11)
The sole output descriptor is (journey). The input descriptors are (labour1, labour2,
energy, vehicles, network length), business conditions (population, public, spublic,
private, Managed, Net, Gross).
This is the production frontier model, known as the error components model in Coelli,
Rao and Battese (1998). The variables have been defined and characterized in Table 2.
Table 3 presents the results obtained for the stochastic production frontier, using a
Gauss program and using a half-normal distribution specification. For comparative
purposes a non random frontier model alongside a traditional production function are
estimated.
INSERT Table 3
                                                








































The results of the latent frontier model are presented, which reports the parameter
estimation and their significance for all the variables. The log-likelihood value of the
estimated latent mixed logit model is 1252.132. The overall fit of the model is
reasonably good with Chi-square statistic square value of 205.123 with 10 degrees of
freedom and level of significance of 0.00052.
What do these results mean for the hypotheses proposed? Primarily, one can conclude
that there are three segments in the data sample, which are statistically significant. The
first one is the more representative, since the probability of a company to be allocated to
this segment of 0.527 whereas the second segment has a probability of 0.317 and the
third 0.156.
What are the characteristics of these segments? This first segment is composed by
companies characterised by a positive relationship between the inputs and outputs
contributing to production, Varian (1987), but with a negative relationship with Trend
square, Managed, Net and Gross. This segment can be characterised as generic bus
companies, Roy and Yvrande-Billion (2007). The second segment is composed of
companies with a positive relationship with inputs and outputs contributing to
production and a negative relationship with trend-square, managed, Net and Gross. This
segment can be characterised as public enterprises model, based in the significant result
of the public dummy and the insignificant parameters related with private bus
companies and its attributes (public, managed, Net and Gross). The third segment has
also a positive relationship with inputs and outputs but a negative relationship with
square trend, managed, Net and Gross. These results combined with the statistical








































Finally, the production increases at decreasing rate according the trend square variable,
signifying that technological improvement increase at decreasing rate.
6.2 Discussion
The interpretation of the previous results is as follows. First, they allow us to conclude
that latent frontier models describe the French urban public transport well, when
allowing for heterogeneity and defining segments in the sample. This is possibly the
main result of the present paper. The implication of this result is that a common
transport policy would be inappropriate for being applied to all transport companies,
since the three segments identified advocate for the existence of heterogeneity.
Therefore any transport policy which involves some of these heterogeneous variables
has to be tailored by segments. Second, our analysis has led us to identify three
segments. Does this mean that there are only two segments in the French public urban
transport companies? No, it signifies that given the small number of observations
available, the model cannot differentiate more segments. The third finding is that, for
companies in the first segment, are defined as generic French bus companies, a picture
that emerges with traditional homogenous frontier models (Roy and Yvrande-Billion
2007). The results for the first segment are intuitive and it is in accordance with the
economic theory (Cf. Varian, 1987).
In the second segment, the companies are identified as public companies. How can the
signs of the variables, for the second segment, be explained? All the statistical
significant parameters have signs equal to the first segment. At European level public
companies are recognised as tending to contract more labour than need and therefore
this result supports previous research in the field, Davis (1971), Chang and Kao (1992),








































What is the overall rationality of these results? They are in fact quite intuitive since bus
companies are not homogenous. Notice, for instance that there are small and large bus
companies;. These visible characteristics result in different performance levels,
dissimilar transportation flux and discrepancy in their financial debts, which provokes
different segments in the sample. In the case of the French bus companies there are two
different segments that can be distinguished on the grounds of the values and signs of
the exogenous variables: Generic, private and public.
What is the implication of the results for the hypotheses? First, we do not reject
the first hypothesis since there is evidence that private enterprises are more efficient
than public enterprises. This result is based in the negative sign of the attributes of
private managed companies (Manage, Net and Gross) when compared with the sign of
the coefficient of public companies. This result is also supported in previous research in
this field, Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) with alternative
models. This result serves as a cross-validation of previous results in this field.
Second, we do not reject hypothesis two, based in the sign of managed in all
segments. Therefore we conclude private companies with cost plus contract perform
efficiently searching for profits, Williamson (1979, 1985).
Third, we do not reject hypothesis three, based in the sign of Net variable in all
segments. Therefore private companies with net cost contract perform efficiently
searching for profits (Caves and Porter, 1977).
Finally, we do not reject hypothesis four, based in the sign of Gross variable in
all segments. Therefore private companies with net cost contract perform efficiently








































Therefore, it can be concluded that, in this context, private bus companies are more
efficient, than public bus companies. This is supported in the theory of transaction costs
and property rights, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1979, 1985),
signifying that French bus companies have a clear relationship with the regulator, with
the firms allocating dedicated asset specificity, Williamson (1985) according to the
population density and network length. This means that private French bus companies
search for profits in a regulated environment relatively clear. This results in private
companies operating either under management cost-plus contract, or net cost contract or
even gross costs contract being efficient. What are the most efficient private forms of
management? The model does not clearly separates the different forms of management,
but the value and significance of the parameters can serve as a clue that cross-validates
previous research in the field, Roy and Yvrande-Billion (2007).
Therefore, assuming the asset specificity strategy, private companies managed by
whichever contract are assumed to be efficient, displaying unique specific management
assets are seen as exhibiting inherently differentiated levels of efficiency and
sustainable production are ultimately a return on the unique assets owned and controlled
by the transport companies (Teece et al., 1997). The property resource is the main factor
segmenting the sample.  In addition, the  strategic-groups theory (Caves and Porter,
1977), which justifies different efficiency scores on the grounds of differences in the
structural characteristics of units within an industry, could explain part of the efficiency
differences observed in the French public urban transport. All these dynamics are
derived from a clear allocative contract that minimises transaction costs and property









































This article has proposed a simple framework for the comparative evaluation French
urban public transport companies and the rationalisation of their operational activities.
The analysis is carried out through implementation of the latent frontier model, which
allows for the incorporation of multiple inputs and outputs in determining the relative
efficiencies and the inclusion of heterogeneity observed in the data. Several managerial
insights and interesting implications of the results have been discussed. The main
conclusion is that, on average, the latent frontier model captures the dynamics observed
in the data better than the precedent techniques applied in this context. In particular, our
results suggest that labour1, energy, vehicles, network length and population are major
homogenous among different factor. Property status and labour 2 differentiates the
segments. Nevertheless, more investigation is needed to confirm the results of the
present research.
The main limitation of this paper is related to the data set, since the data span is
relatively short, restricting the estimation of latent classes to only three classes. Having
access to a larger data span would allow more latent variables to emerge. In any case,
the scope of the present paper is satisfactorily achieved, given the exploratory character
of it. In specific, the intention of this study is to draw the attention of the public
transport companies towards identifying segments among them, and defining business
strategies for each transport segment in order to adapt strategies to their characteristics.
To achieve more conclusive policy prescriptions, a larger data set would be required.
Precisely, the limitations of the present paper suggest directions for new research.








































clarify the issues described above. Secondly, research taking into account the presence
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Table 1: Research on bus companies efficiency
Papers Method Units Inputs Outputs
Karlaftis (2004) DEA-CCR







(1) Number of employees, (2) fuel














(1) fleet size, (2) liters of fuel, (3)
total number of employees hours.
Tobit model variables: (1) average
speed, (2) peak/base ratio, (3)
average fleet age, (4) time trend
(1) revenue vehicle
kilometers.









 (1) Fuel costs, (2) driver costs, (3)
other costs
 (1) Seat kilometers










(1) Fuel consumption in liters, (2)
material, (3) effective driving hours,
















(1) effective driving hours, (2) total



















(1) ratio fuel/100 kilometers; (2)
ratio cost/km, (3) ratio
subsidy/traveller.
Regression variables: (1) ratio
cost/travellers, (2) ratio fuel/100
kms; (3) ratio km/bus.
Logit variables: (1) ratio
Km/employees, (2) ratio Km/bus,
(3) ratio km/inhabitants, (4)
inhabitants, (5) index of accidents,
(6) frequency of accidents, (7) ratio
fuel/100 km, (8) ratio





















(1) total staff employed, (2) buses













(1) average fleet age; (2) number of
directional miles; (3) fleet size; (4)
gallons of fuel by mode; (5)
persons-hour of transportation; (6)
persons-hour of maintenance; (7)
persons hour of administrative; (8)
persons-hour of capital; (9) costs
with tires and material; (10) service

















































(1) average speed, (2) average fleet
age, (3) number of directional miles,
(4) fleet size, (5) gallons of fuel by
mode; (6) persons-hour of
transportation; (7) persons-hour of
maintenance; (8) persons hour of
administrative; (9) persons-hour of
capital, (10) costs with tires and
material, (11) service cost, (12)
utilities costs; (13) insurance cost.
(1) vehicles-miles; (2)
passengers trips;













(1) total cost per vehicle-kms (1) vehicle-kms
produced, (2) average
bus size measured by




dummy for the case
where the bus operator















(1) number of vehicles in use; (2)
employees; (39 total fuel
consumption;
Tobit model variables: (1) a dummy
for ownership, (2) a dummy for
group; (3) mean line length, (4)
average distance between stops, (5)
speed, (6) population density, (7)
average age of the bus vehicles, (8)
agreement type, (9) duration of the
agreement contract.












(1) total cost per vehicle-kms (1) vehicle-kms
produced, (2) average
bus size measured by




dummy for the case
where the bus operator












































Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the data  1995-2002
Variable Description Min Max Mean Std dev
ln (VehicleKm) The number of kilometers cover
by vehicles
5.251 7.056 6.169 0.445
ln (Labour1) The number of equivalent
employees-drivers
1.945 6.537 4.118 1.063
ln (Labour2) The number of equivalent
employees non-drivers
-0.693 4.036 2.997 1.562
ln (Energy) The quantity of  diesel m
3
consumed
1.799 6.779 4.777 1.659
ln (Vehicles) The number of vehicles 1.609 4.127 3.819 2.103
ln (Network length) The total lines length 2.639 5.319 4.790 0.805
ln (Population) The population in the area
covered by the network
4.141 12.848 11.261 0.729
ln (Journeys) The number of journey
3 5.153 10.553 8.170 ⎯
Public Public company 0 1 0.065 ⎯
Spublic Semi-public company (SEM) 0 1 0.2528 ⎯
Private Private company 0 1 0.681 ⎯
Managed Private or semi-public company
operating under management
(cost-plus) contract
0 1 0.265 ⎯
Net Private or semi-public company
with net cost contract
0 1 0.417 ⎯
Gross Private or semi-public company
with gross cost contract
0 1 0.253 ⎯
                                                
3 A trip usually involves more than one single journey.  Typically, if somebody travel in two different








































Table 3: Latent Translog panel production frontier (dependent variable: ln
Vehicle-Km)
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(t-statistics) in parentheses are below the parameters. Those followed by * are significant at 1% level.  Those followed by ** are
significant at 5% level.
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
1
2
2
8
7
1
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
5
 
J
a
n
 
2
0
0
7